During the first two decades of the Cold War, a new kind of academic figure became prominent in American public life: the credentialed social scientist or expert in the sciences of administration who was also, to use the parlance of the time, a “man of affairs.” Some were academic high-fliers conscripted into government roles in which their intellectual and organizational talents could be exploited. McGeorge Bundy, Walt Rostow, and Robert McNamara are the archetypes of such persons. An overlapping group of scholars became policymakers and political advisers on issues ranging from social welfare provision to nation-building in emerging postcolonial states. Many of these men—and almost without exception they were men—were also consummate operators within the patronage system that grew up around American universities after World War II. Postwar leaders of the social and administrative sciences such as Talcott Parsons and Herbert Simon were skilled scientific brokers of just this sort: good “committee men,” grant-getters, proponents of interdisciplinary inquiry, and institution-builders. This hard-nosed, suit-wearing, business-like persona was connected to new, technologically refined forms of social science. No longer sage-like social philosophers or hardscrabble, number-crunching empiricists, academic human scientists portrayed themselves as possessors of tools and programs designed for precision social engineering. Antediluvian “social science” was eschewed in favour of mathematical, behavioural, and systems-based approaches to “human relations” such as operations research, behavioral science, game theory, systems theory, and cognitive science.
1 See Milne, David, America's Rasputin: Walt Rostow and the Vietnam War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2008); Preston, Andrew, The War Council: McGeorge Bundy, the NSC, and Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).
2 E.g. O'Connor, Alice, Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S. History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Simpson, Bradley R., Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.–Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008).
3 On the postwar patronage of the social sciences see Hunter Crowther-Heyck, “Patrons of the Revolution: Ideals and Institutions in Postwar Behavioral Science,” Isis 97 (Sept. 2006), 420–46; Lagemann, Ellen Condliffe, The Politics of Knowledge: The Carnegie Corporation, Philanthropy, and Public Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Solovey, Mark, “Riding Natural Scientists’ Coattails onto the Endless Frontier: The SSRC and the Quest for Scientific Legitimacy,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 40 (Fall 2004), 393–422.
4 Johnston, Barry, “Sorokin and Parsons at Harvard: Institutional Conflict and the Origin of a Hegemonic Tradition,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 22 (April 1986), 107–27; Buxton, William C., Talcott Parsons and the Capitalist Nation-State: Political Sociology as Strategic Vocation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985); Crowther-Heyck, Hunter, Herbert A. Simon: The Bounds of Reason in Modern America (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005).
5 But for the beginnings of such an enterprise see Theodore M. Porter and Dorothy Ross, eds., The Cambridge History of Science, vol. 7, The Modern Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Isaac, Joel, “The Human Sciences in Cold War America,” Historical Journal 50 (Sept. 2007), 725–46.
6 I shall examine these views in more detail below. For a characteristic example of this approach see Latham, Michael E., Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
7 Skinner, Quentin, Visions of Politics, vol. 1, Regarding Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
8 Galison, Peter, Image and Logic: A Material Culture of Microphysics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Hebdige, Dick, Subculture: The Meaning of Style (London and New York: Routledge, 1979).
9 On experimentation and fieldwork as forms of life see e.g. Gooding, David, Pinch, Trevor, and Schaffer, Simon, eds., The Uses of Experiment: Studies in the Natural Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Clifford, James, “On Ethnographic Self-Fashioning: Conrad and Malinowski,” in Heller, Thomas C., Sosna, Morton, and Wellbery, David E., eds., Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986), 140–62; George Stocking Jr, “The Ethnographer's Magic: Fieldwork in British Anthropology from Tylor to Malinowski,” in idem, The Ethnographer's Magic and Other Essays in the History of Anthropology (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992), 12–59.
10 Hacking, Ian, “The Looping Effects of Human Kinds,” in Sperber, Dan, Premack, David, and Premack, Ann James, eds., Causal Cognition: A Multidisciplinary Debate (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 351–83
11 Such sentences were (on one construal) indubitable phenomenological reports on private sense experiences: “red square here.” Another influential account defined protocol sentences as reports on intersubjectively observable physical objects—”medium-sized dry goods,” as Austin later put it. On protocol sentences see Uebel, Thomas E., Overcoming Logical Positivism from Within: The Emergence of Neurath's Naturalism in the Vienna Circle's Protocol Sentence Debate (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1992).
12 Galison, Image and Logic, 790.
13 Hacking, Ian, Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Social Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
14 Galison, Image and Logic, 793.
15 Quine, W. V., “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Philosophical Review 60 (Jan. 1951), 20–43; Kuhn, Thomas, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd edn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Lakatos, Imre, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,” in Lakatos, Imre and Musgrave, Alan, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 91–196; Polanyi, Michael, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-critical Philosophy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958). On “central metaphors” see Galison, Image and Logic, 784–803.
16 For commentary on the complementary, or at any rate non-mutually exclusive, perspectives of Carnap and Kuhn see Reisch, George A., “Did Kuhn Kill Logical Empiricism?” Philosophy of Science 58 (June 1991), 264–77; Earman, John, “Carnap, Kuhn, and the Philosophy of Scientific Methodology,” in Horwich, Paul, ed., World Changes: Thomas Kuhn and the Nature of Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 9–36; Irzik, Gürol and Grünberg, Teo, “Carnap and Kuhn: Arch Enemies or Close Allies?” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (Sept. 1995), 285–307; Galison, Peter, “Context and Constraints,” in Buchwald, Jed, ed., Scientific Practice: Theories and Stories of Doing Physics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 29–32; Achinstein, Peter, “Subjective Views of Kuhn,” Perspectives on Science 9 (Winter 2001), 423–32; Friedman, Michael, “Kuhn and Logical Empiricism,” in Nickles, Thomas, ed., Thomas Kuhn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 19–44.
17 Leading the charge away from theory and toward practice-oriented accounts of science was Hacking, Representing and Intervening, esp. 273–5. Three books helped to define the new concern with experimentation in the history of science: Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); Gooding, Pinch, and Schaffer, Uses of Experiment; Buchwald, Scientific Practice.
18 Kuhn, Thomas, “Second Thoughts on Paradigms” in idem, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 293–319; idem, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 182–7. For a strong practice-oriented reading of Kuhn see Joseph Rouse, “Kuhn's Philosophy of Scientific Practice,” in Nickles, Thomas Kuhn, 101–21.
19 Geertz, Clifford, “The Way We Think Now: Toward an Ethnography of Modern Thought,” in idem, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology, new edn (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 156–63.
20 Latour, Bruno, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 241–3.
21 Galison, Peter, How Experiments End (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 245–55. Two important early essays that explored the place of theory in the new sociological studies of experiment are Lenoir, Timothy, “Practice, Reason, Context: The Dialogue between Theory and Experiment,” Science in Context 2 (1988), 3–22; and Golinski, Jan, “The Theory of Practice and the Practice of Theory: Sociological Approaches in the History of Science,” Isis 81 (Sept. 1990), 492–505.
22 Galison, Image and Logic, 803–44.
23 Ibid., 803–4.
24 Warwick, Andrew, “Cambridge Mathematics and Cavendish Physics: Cunningham, Campbell and Einstein's Relativity 1905–1911: Part I: The Uses of Theory,” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 23 (1992), 632, italics in original; Kaiser, Drawing Theories Apart: The Dispersion of Feynman Diagrams in Postwar Physics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 8. For Klein's work see Klein, Ursula, “Paper Tools in Experimental Cultures,” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 32 (2001), 265–302; idem, “Techniques of Modelling and Paper-Tools in Classical Chemistry,” in Mary Morgan and Margaret Morrison, eds., Models as Mediators: Perspectives on Natural and Social Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 146–67. See also Pickering, Andrew and Stephanides, Adam, “Constructing Quarternions: On the Analysis of Conceptual Practice,” in Pickering, Andrew, ed., Science as Practice and Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 139–67
25 Klein, “Paper Tools,” 266–7.
26 Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 187–91.
27 Warwick, Andrew and Kaiser, David, “Kuhn, Foucault, and the Power of Pedagogy,” in Kaiser, David, ed., Pedagogy and the Practice of Science: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 393–409.
28 Recent retrospectives on the “moment” of theory in the humanities include Eagleton, Terry, After Theory (London: Allen Lane, 2003); Culler, Jonathan, The Literary in Theory (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); and Brennan, Timothy, Wars of Position: The Cultural Politics of Left and Right (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).
29 Hunter, Ian, “The History of Philosophy and the Persona of the Philosopher,” MIH 4 (Nov. 2007), 574.
30 See Hunter, Ian, “The History of Theory,” Critical Inquiry 33 (Autumn 2006), 81–3; idem, “The Time of Theory,” Postcolonial Studies 10 (2007), 5–6; idem, “The History of Philosophy,” 572.
31 Hunter, “Time of Theory,” 6.
32 Michel Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” in idem, Ethics: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984, vol. 1 (London: Penguin, 2000), 225.
33 See Hadot, Pierre, What Is Ancient Philosophy?, trans. Chase, Michael (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); Davidson, Arnold, “Ethics as Ascetics: Foucault, the History of Ethics, and Ancient Thought,” in Gutting, Gary, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 123–48.
34 This distinction between the discursive and the non-discursive is taken from Geuss, Raymond, The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 5–6.
35 One commentator on the meaning of theory in sociology has identified seven distinct definitions of the term. See Gabriel Abend, “The Meaning of ‘Theory’,” Sociological Theory 26 (June 2008), 177–81.
36 See Bourdieu, Pierre, Homo Academicus, trans. Collier, Peter (Cambridge: Polity, 1988). For an elaboration of Bourdieu's sociology of the intellectual field see Camic, Charles and Gross, Neil, “The New Sociology of Ideas,” in Blau, Judith R., ed., The Blackwell Companion to Sociology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 236–49.
37 For example, as late as 1941, Robert Merton was lamenting the lack of clarity and agreement on the definition of “theory” in sociology. See Robert K. Merton, Review of Harry Elmer Barnes, Howard Becker, and Frances Bennett Becker, eds., Contemporary Social Theory, American Sociological Review 6 (April 1941), 282–6.
38 Ross, Dorothy, The Origins of American Social Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Haskell, Thomas, The Emergence of Professional Social Science: The American Social Science Association and the Nineteenth-Century Crisis of Authority, new edn (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); Furner, Mary O., Advocacy and Objectivity: A Crisis in the Professionalization of American Social Science (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1975); Bannister, Robert C., Sociology and Scientism: The American Quest for Objectivity, 1880–1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987); Smith, Mark C., Social Science in the Crucible: The American Debate over Objectivity and Purpose, 1918–1941 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994), 13–48.
39 On this and related points about the turn to theory in the 1930s see Crowther-Heyck, Herbert A. Simon, 108–12.
40 See e.g. Henderson, Lawrence Joseph, Pareto's General Sociology: A Physiologist's Interpretation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935); Russett, Cynthia Eagle, The Concept of Equilibrium in American Social Thought (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Stephen J. Cross and William R. Albury, “Walter B. Cannon, L. J. Henderson, and the Organic Analogy,” Osiris 3 (1987), 165–92.
41 George F. Stocking Jr, “The Ethnographic Sensibility of the 1920s and the Dualism of the Anthropological Tradition,” in idem, The Ethnographer's Magic, 276–341; Susman, Warren I., “Culture and Civilization: The Nineteen-Twenties,” in idem, Culture as History: The Transformation of American Society in the Twentieth Century (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 105–21.
42 Hughes, H. Stuart, The Sea Change: The Migration of Social Thought, 1930–1965 (New York: Harper and Row, 1975). For an early American take on the European tradition of social theory, see Parsons, Talcott, The Structure of Social Action (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937).
43 See Mirowski, Philip, “The When, the How, and the Why of Mathematical Expression in the History of Economic Analysis,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5 (Winter 1991), 145–57; Joel Isaac, “Theories of Knowledge and the American Human Sciences, 1920–1960,” Ph.D. diss., University of Cambridge, 2005, chap. 3.
44 Galison, Image and Logic, 787–90.
45 On the war years as a watershed in American scientific traditions see Peter Galison, “The Americanization of Unity,” Daedalus 127 (Winter 1998), 45–71.
46 Galison, Peter, “The Ontology of the Enemy: Norbert Wiener and the Cybernetic Vision,” Critical Inquiry 21 (Autumn 1994), 228–66.
47 Mirowski, Philip, Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes a Cyborg Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Crowther-Heyck, Herbert A. Simon; Jennifer Light, “Taking Games Seriously,” Technology and Culture 49 (April 2008), 347–75; Ghamari-Tabrizi, Sharon, The Worlds of Herman Kahn: The Intuitive Science of Thermonuclear War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Hughes, Agatha and Hughes, Thomas, eds., Systems, Experts, and Computers: The Systems Approach in Management and Engineering: World War II and after (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); Edwards, Paul N., The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Postwar America (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).
48 Amadae, S. M., Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003); Hauptmann, Emily, Putting Choice before Democracy: A Critique of Rational Choice Theory (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996); Hall, Peter A., “The Dilemmas of Contemporary Social Science,” boundary 2 34 (Fall 2007), 121–41.
49 Miller, James Grier, “Toward a General Theory for the Behavioral Sciences,” in White, Leonard D., ed., The State of the Social Sciences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 29–65; Berelson, Bernard, The Behavioral Sciences Today (New York: Basic Books, 1963); Crowther-Heyck, “Patrons of the Revolution.”
50 Gilman, Nils, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); Engerman, David C., Modernization from the Other Shore: American Intellectuals and the Romance of Russian Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); Engerman, David C., Gilman, Nils, Haefele, Mark H., and Latham, Michael, eds., Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003); Latham, Modernization as Ideology. On the deep origins of modernization theory see Wilcox, Clifford, Robert Redfield and the Development of American Anthropology (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2004).
51 Mirowski, Machine Dreams, 207–22, 232–308; idem, “Cowles Changes Allegiance: From Empiricism to Cognition as Intuitive Statistics,” Journal of the History of Economic Thought 24 (June 2002), 165–93.
52 See also Hands, D. Wade and Mirowski, Philip, “A Paradox of Budgets: The Postwar Stabilization of Neoclassical Demand Theory,” in Morgan, Mary and Rutherford, Malcolm, eds., From Interwar Pluralism to Postwar Neoclassicism, Annual Supplement to Volume 30, History of Political Economy (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 260–92.
53 E. Roy Weintraub, How Economics Became a Mathematical Science (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002).
54 Crowther-Heyck, Hunter, “Herbert Simon and the GSIA: Building an Interdisciplinary Community,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 42 (Fall 2006), 311–34.
55 Cohen-Cole, Jamie, “Instituting the Science of the Mind: Intellectual Economies and Disciplinary Exchanges at Harvard's Center for Cognitive Studies,” British Journal for the History of Science 40 (Dec. 2007), 567–97; idem, “The Reflexivity of Cognitive Science: The Scientist as Model of Human Nature,” History of the Human Sciences, 18 (Nov. 2005), 107–39. For a general history of cognitive science as an interdisciplinary research field see Gardener, Howard, The Mind's New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution, new edn (New York: Basic Books, 1987).
56 See Gilman, Mandarins of the Future; David C. Engerman, “West Meets East: The Center for International Studies and Indian Economic Development,” in Engerman, et al., Staging Growth, 199–223.
57 Engerman, David C., ‘New Society, New Scholarship: Soviet Studies in Interwar America’, Minerva 37 (March 1999), 25–43; idem, “The Ironies of the Iron Curtain: The Cold War and the Rise of Russian Studies in the United States’, Cahiers du Monde russe, 45 (2004), 465–96.
58 Emily Hauptmann, “A Local History of ‘The Political’,” Political Theory 32 (Feb. 2004), 34–60; idem, “From Opposition to Accommodation: How Rockefeller Foundation Grants Redefined Relations between Political Theory and Social Science in the 1950s,” American Political Science Review 100 (Nov. 2006), 643–9; idem, “Defining ‘Theory’ in Postwar Political Science,” in George Steinmetz, ed., The Politics of Method in the Human Sciences: Positivism and Its Epistemological Others (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 207–32. See also Adcock, Robert and Bevir, Mark, “The Remaking of Political Theory,” in Adcock, Robert, Bevir, Mark, and Stimson, Shannon C., eds., Modern Political Science: Anglo-American Exchanges since 1800 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 209–33.
59 S. M. Amadae and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “The Rochester School: The Origins of Positive Political Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science 1 (1999), 269–95.
60 Hauptmann, “Defining ‘Theory’“; David Easton, “The Decline of Modern Political Theory,” Journal of Politics 13 (Feb. 1951), 36–58; idem, The Political System (New York: Knopf, 1953); Riker, William H. and Ordeshook, Peter C., An Introduction to Positive Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973); Friedman, Milton, “The Methodology of Positive Economics,” in idem, Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 3–43.
61 On the declension from scientific philosophy to philosophy of science see Gary L. Hardcastle and Alan Richardson, eds., Logical Empiricism in North America (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003); Reisch, George A., How the Cold War Transformed Philosophy of Science: To the Icy Slopes of Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
62 Gunnell, John G., The Descent of Political Theory: The Genealogy of an American Vocation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 222–5.
63 See e.g. Kenneth Arrow's epistemological remarks in “Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences,” in Lerner, Daniel and Lasswell, Harold D., eds., The Policy Sciences (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951), 129–54.
64 Hacking, “Looping Effect,” 352, 361, 369.
65 Hacking, Ian, “Making up People,” in idem, Historical Ontology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 107.
66 On the emergence of the homosexual as a social role see McIntosh, Mary, “The Homosexual Role,” Social Problems 16 (Autumn 1968), 182–92; Hacking, “Making up People,” 103.
67 Hacking, “Looping Effect,” 368–70. See also idem, “The Making and Molding of Child Abuse,” Critical Inquiry 17 (Winter 1991), 254–5.
68 Hacking, “Making up People,” 108.
69 This is not to mark a sharp conceptual or methodological distinction between the Geisteswissenschaften and the Naturwissenschaften. The looping effect is not an epistemological criterion. The most perfectly naturalistic social-scientific theory may loop into human self-understandings just as well as hermeneutic or interpretive concepts. Hence the historian can remain agnostic about the possibility of a natural science of human behavior. Even if one existed, it could still “contaminate” the descriptions of those with access to that knowledge. For further reflections on this topic see Hacking, “Looping Effects,” 364.
70 See Taylor, Charles, “Social Theory as Practice,” Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 91–115.
71 See Bourdieu, Pierre, Pascalian Meditations, trans. Nice, Richard (Cambridge: Polity, 2000), 17–24.
72 Hacking, Ian, The Taming of Chance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); idem, “Multiple Personality Disorder and Its Hosts,” History of the Human Sciences 5 (May 1992), 3–31; idem, “The Making and Molding of Child Abuse”; idem, Mad Travellers: Reflections on the Reality of Transient Mental Illnesses (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1998).
73 Igo, Sarah, The Averaged American: Surveys, Citizens, and the Making of a Mass Public (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). Hacking's work on “making up people” is also invoked in Jamie Cohen-Cole, “Thinking about Thinking in Cold War America,” unpublished Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 2003.
74 Callon, Michel, “Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics,” in idem, The Laws of Markets (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 29–30.
75 Fourcade, Marion, “Theories of Markets and Theories of Society,” American Behavioral Scientist 50 (April 2008), 1025.
76 Fourcade, Marion and Healy, Kieran, “Moral Views of Market Society,” Annual Review of Sociology 33 (2007), 285–311.
77 MacKenzie, Donald, An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006).
78 MacKenzie, Donald and Millo, Yuval, “Constructing a Market, Performing a Theory: The Historical Sociology of a Financial Derivatives Exchange,” American Journal of Sociology 109 (July 2003), 107–45. Hacking's account of the looping effect is explicitly invoked in Donald MacKenzie, “An Equation and Its Worlds: Bricolage, Exemplars, Disunity, and Performativity in Financial Economics,” Social Studies of Science 33 (Dec. 2003), 835.
79 MacKenzie and Millo, “Constructing a Market,” 108–9, 112–15.
80 Stephen A. Ross quoted in ibid., 109.
81 Ibid., 120–27. See also MacKenzie, “An Equation and Its Worlds.”
82 MacKenzie and Millo, “Constructing a Market,” 127–35.
83 MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera, 19.
84 Hacking, Ian, Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); O'Connor, Poverty Knowledge.
85 See footnote 71 above.
86 Taylor, Charles, Modern Social Imaginaries (Duke, NC: Duke University Press, 2004); Skinner, Visions of Politics, vol. 1.
87 Light, “Taking Games Seriously.”
* For their invaluable comments on earlier drafts of this essay, my thanks to Howard Brick, Angus Burgin, Charles Capper, John Carson, Jamie Cohen-Cole, Daniel Geary, Ian Hunter, James Kloppenberg, Peter Mandler, Dan Stone, and the anonymous referees for MIH. I am especially indebted to Duncan Bell and Andrew Jewett for criticisms and suggestions concerning the issues covered in this essay.
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