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Are There Rival, Incommensurable Theories?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Dale W. Moberg
Dale W. Moberg*
Affiliation:
Hobart & William Smith Colleges and University of Illinois at Chicago Circle
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Abstract

Following an account of the incommensurability argument, an objection, based on assumptions concerning rival theories, is examined and rejected. This rejection leads to an alternative direction of criticism of incommensurability, a direction that involves the articulation of comparative standards of theory evaluation that are independent of meaning invariance.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 46 , Issue 2 , June 1979 , pp. 244 - 262
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1979

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