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Can Physicalist Antireductionism Compute the Embryo?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Alex Rosenberg
Alex Rosenberg*
Affiliation:
University Of Georgia
*
†Department Of Philosophy, University Of Georgia, Athens, Georgia, 30602-6116
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Abstract

It is widely held that (1) there are autonomous levels of organization above that of the macromolecule and that (2) at least sometimes macromolecular processes are best explained in terms of such autonomous kinds. I argue that molecular developmental biology honors neither of these claims, and I show that the only way they can be rendered consistent with a minimal physicalism is through the adoption of controversial claims about causation and explanation which undercut the force of these two antireductionism claims.

Information

Type
Symposium: Emergence and Supervenience: Alternatives to Unity by Reduction
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 64 , Issue S4: Supplement. Proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers Dec., 1997 , 1997 , pp. S359 - S371
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1997

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