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Causality Without Counterfactuals

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Wesley C. Salmon
Wesley C. Salmon*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department University of Pittsburgh
*
‡Send reprint requests to the author, Philosophy Department, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA.
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Abstract

This paper presents a drastically revised version of the theory of causality, based on analyses of causal processes and causal interactions, advocated in Salmon (1984). Relying heavily on modified versions of proposals by P. Dowe, this article answers penetrating objections by Dowe and P. Kitcher to the earlier theory. It shows how the new theory circumvents a host of difficulties that have been raised in the literature. The result is, I hope, a more satisfactory analysis of physical causality.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 61 , Issue 2 , June 1994 , pp. 297 - 312
Copyright
Copyright © 1994 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I should like to express my sincere thanks to Philip Kitcher, Allen Janis, and an anonymous referee for extremely valuable comments on this paper.

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