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Computational and Conceptual Emergence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Paul Humphreys
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Abstract

A twofold taxonomy for emergence is presented into which a variety of contemporary accounts of emergence fit. The first taxonomy consists of inferential, conceptual, and ontological emergence; the second of diachronic and synchronic emergence. The adequacy of weak emergence, a computational form of inferential emergence, is then examined and its relationship to conceptual emergence and ontological emergence is detailed.

Type
Computational Emergence and Its Applications
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 75 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2006 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers. Edited by Cristina Bicchieri and Jason Alexander , December 2008 , pp. 584 - 594
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

Conversations and correspondence with Mark Bedau, Philippe Huneman, and Cyrille Imbert have much improved this paper.

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