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A Conception of Inductive Logic

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Abstract

I conceive of inductive logic as a project of explication. The explicandum is one of the meanings of the word `probability' in ordinary language; I call it inductive probability and argue that it is logical, in a certain sense. The explicatum is a conditional probability function that is specified by stipulative definition. This conception of inductive logic is close to Carnap's, but common objections to Carnapian inductive logic (the probabilities don't exist, are arbitrary, etc.) do not apply to this conception.

Type
Confirmation and Inductive Logic
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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