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Convention and the Origins of Ownership

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Abstract

We examine contemporary game-theoretic accounts of ownership as a convention. New results from dynamic networks complicate matters, suggesting that if ownership is conventional, it should not be as prevalent as it seems to be. In fact, such models reveal a tendency toward antiownership norms. The value of resources may be crucial: low stakes lead to conventional ownership, but ownership norms rarely evolve; high stakes lead to a predominance of ownership at the cost of its conventionality. We argue that conventional ownership norms can originate in nonconventional ways and discuss some philosophical implications.

Type
Formal Epistemology and Game Theory
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

We would like to thank Brian Skyrms, the participants at the PSA 2018 meeting, and the participants at PBDB13 for helpful discussion and commentary. Both authors contributed equally to this article.

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