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Depragmatized Dutch Book Arguments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Patrick Maher*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
*
Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 105 Gregory Hall, 810 South Wright St., Urbana, IL 61801.

Abstract

Recently a number of authors have tried to avoid the failures of traditional Dutch book arguments by separating them from pragmatic concerns of avoiding a sure loss. In this paper I examine defenses of this kind by Howson and Urbach, Hellman, and Christensen. I construct rigorous explications of their arguments and show that they are not cogent. I advocate abandoning Dutch book arguments in favor of a representation theorem.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1997 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

Christensen, David (1996), “Dutch-Book Arguments Depragmatized: Epistemic Consistency for Partial Believers”, Journal of Philosophy 93: 450479.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hellman, Geoffrey (1997), “Bayes and Beyond”, Philosophy of Science. 64: 191221.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Howson, Colin and Urbach, Peter (1993), Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach. Second edition, Chicago: Open Court.Google Scholar
Lakatos, Imre (1970), “The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes”, in Lakatos, I. and Musgrave, A. (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. London: Cambridge University Press, pp. 91196.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maher, Patrick (1993), Betting on Theories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maher, Patrick and Kashima, Yoshihisa (1997), “Preference Reversal in Ellsberg Problems”, Philosophical Studies. 88: 187207.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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