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Does Science License Metaphysics?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Olin M. Robus
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Abstract

Naturalized metaphysicians defend the thesis that science licenses metaphysics, such that only metaphysical results based on the best science are legitimate. This view is problematic, due to the fact that the reasons they identify for such license are apparently self-defeating. Anjan Chakravartty defends a revised approach to understanding the licensing relation. I argue that the proposed response is a step forward on behalf of naturalizing metaphysics but still does not take seriously the contention that science involves, inextricably, a contribution from the a priori. I conclude by considering what options the naturalized metaphysician is left with.

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Type
Metaphysics
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 82 , Issue 5 , December 2015 , pp. 845 - 855
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I would like to thank Andrea Woody, Jon Rosenberg, Matthew Sample, and the University of Washington Philosophy of Science Reading Group for invaluable commentary and feedback.

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