Hostname: page-component-7dd5485656-7jgsp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-10-30T12:04:09.521Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Duhem's Problem, the Bayesian Way, and Error Statistics, or “What's Belief Got to Do with It?”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Deborah G. Mayo
Deborah G. Mayo*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
*
†Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061-0126.
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

I argue that the Bayesian Way of reconstructing Duhem's problem fails to advance a solution to the problem of which of a group of hypotheses ought to be rejected or “blamed” when experiment disagrees with prediction. But scientists do regularly tackle and often enough solve Duhemian problems. When they do, they employ a logic and methodology which may be called error statistics. I discuss the key properties of this approach which enable it to split off the task of testing auxiliary hypotheses from that of appraising a primary hypothesis. By discriminating patterns of error, this approach can at least block, if not also severely test, attempted explanations of an anomaly. I illustrate how this approach directs progress with Duhemian problems and explains how scientists actually grapple with them.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 64 , Issue 2 , June 1997 , pp. 222 - 244
Copyright
Copyright © 1997 by the Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Footnotes

‡

I thank Philip Kitcher and an anomymous referee for extremely useful queries on a very early version of this paper. Variations on this paper have been presented at the University of Pittsburgh, Virginia Tech, The London School of Economics and Political Science, the University of Rochester, and the University of Minnesota. I benefited greatly from the questions and criticisms of all of these audiences.

References

Dorling, J. (1979), “Bayesian Personalism, the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, and Duhem's Problem”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 10:177–187.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Duhem, P. (1954), The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Translated by P. Wiener. New York: Atheneum.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Duhem, P. (1996), Essays in the History and Philosophy of Science. Translated and edited by R. Ariew and P. Barker. Indianapolis: Hackett.Google Scholar
Dyson, E. W., Eddington, A. S., and Davidson, C. (1923), “A Determination of the Deflection of Light by the Sun's Gravitational Field, from Observations made at the Total Eclipse of May 29, 1919”, Memoirs of the Royal Astronomical Society, Vol. LXII (1917–1923): 291–333.Google Scholar
Earman, J. and Glymour, C. (1980), “Relativity and Eclipses: The British Eclipse Expeditions of 1919 and Their Predecessors”, Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences 11: 49–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eddington, A. (1918), “Gravitation and the Principle of Relativity”, Nature 101 (March 14, 1918): 34–36.Google Scholar
Eddington, A. (1919), “Joint Eclipse Meeting of the Royal Astronomical Society”, Observatory 42: 389–398.Google Scholar
Eddington, A. (1920), Space, Time and Gravitation: An Outline of the General Relativity Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (as reprinted in the Cambridge Science Classics series, 1987).Google Scholar
Glymour, C. (1980), Theory and Evidence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Howson, C. and Urbach, P. (1989), Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach. La Salle: Open Court.Google Scholar
Lindemann, F. A. (1919), (contribution to) “Discussion on the Theory of Relativity”, in Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society LXXX (Dec.): 96–118, p. 114.Google Scholar
Lodge, O. (1919), (contribution to) “Discussion on the Theory of Relativity”, in Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society, LXXX (Dec.): 96–118, pp. 106–109.Google Scholar
Mayo, D. (1985), “Behavioristic, Evidentialist, and Learning Models of Statistical Testing”, Philosophy of Science 52: 493–516.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mayo, D. (1991), “Novel Evidence and Severe Tests”, Philosophy of Science 58: 523–552.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mayo, D. (1996), Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge. Chicago: the University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moyer, D. (1979), “Revolution in Science: The 1919 Eclipse Test of General Relativity Theory”. Edited by A. Perlmutter and L. Scott, 55–72. New York: Plenum Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nature 106: 781–820 (February 1921).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Newall, H. F. (1919), (contribution to) “Joint Eclipse Meeting of the Royal Society and the Royal Astronomical Society”, The Observatory 42 (Nov.): 389–398, pp. 395–396.Google Scholar
Redhead, M. (1980), “A Bayesian Reconstruction of the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 11: 341–347.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shimony, A. (1970), “Scientific Inference”, in Colodny, R. (ed.), The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.Google Scholar
Silberstein, L. (1919), (contribution to) “Joint Eclipse Meeting of the Royal Society and the Royal Astronomical Society”, The Observatory 42 (Nov.): 389–398.Google Scholar
von Klüber, H. (1960), “The Determination of Einstein's Light-Deflection in the Gravitational Field of the Sun”, in A. Beer (ed.), Vistas on Astronomy, vol. 3, pp. 47–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Worrall, J. (1993), “Falsification, Rationality, and the Duhem Problem”, in Earman, J., Janis, A., Massey, G., and Rescher, N. (eds.), Philosophical Problems of the Internal and External Worlds. Essays on the Philosophy of Adolf Grunbaum. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.Google Scholar