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Inductive Risk and Values in Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Heather Douglas*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Puget Sound

Abstract

Although epistemic values have become widely accepted as part of scientific reasoning, non-epistemic values have been largely relegated to the “external” parts of science (the selection of hypotheses, restrictions on methodologies, and the use of scientific technologies). I argue that because of inductive risk, or the risk of error, non-epistemic values are required in science wherever non-epistemic consequences of error should be considered. I use examples from dioxin studies to illustrate how non-epistemic consequences of error can and should be considered in the internal stages of science: choice of methodology, characterization of data, and interpretation of results.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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