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More on Maximal Specificity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Henry E. Kyburg Jr.
Henry E. Kyburg Jr.*
Affiliation:
University of Rochester
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Abstract

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Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 37 , Issue 2 , June 1970 , pp. 295 - 300
Copyright
Copyright © 1970 The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Research relevant to the problems discussed in this note has been supported by National Science Foundation grants 708, 1179, and 1962. The paper has also benefited from the detailed comments that Professor Hempel was kind enough to make on an earlier draft, and from the detailed criticisms offered by a kind, hard-working, and anonymous referee.

References

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