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Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Science

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A Problem for Confirmation Measure Z

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Branden Fitelson
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Abstract

In this article, I present a serious problem for confirmation measure Z.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 88 , Issue 4 , October 2021 , pp. 726 - 730
Copyright
Copyright 2021 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.

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Footnotes

†

I would like to thank Vincenzo Crupi, Graham Oddie, and two anonymous referees of this journal for their helpful feedback on previous versions of this article.

References

Crupi, Vincenzo, and Tentori, Katya. 2014. “State of the Field: Measuring Information and Confirmation.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science A 47:81–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Crupi, Vincenzo, Tentori, Katya, and Gonzalez, Michel. 2007. “On Bayesian Measures of Evidential Support: Theoretical and Empirical Issues.” Philosophy of Science 74 (2): 229–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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Mura, Alberto. 2006. “Deductive Probability, Physical Probability, and Partial Entailment.” In Karl Popper Philosopher of Science, ed. Alai, Mario and Tarozzi, Gino, 181–202. Suveria Mannielli: Rubbettino.Google Scholar
Mura, Alberto. 2008. “Can Logical Probability Be Viewed as a Measure of Degrees of Partial Entailment.” Logic and Philosophy of Science 6:25–33.Google Scholar
Rescher, Nicholas. 1958. “A Theory of Evidence.” Philosophy of Science 25 (1): 83–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shortliffe, Edward H., and Buchanan, Bruce G. 1975. “A Model of Inexact Reasoning in Medicine.” Mathematical Biosciences 23 (3–4): 351–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Törnebohm, Håkan. 1966. “Two Measures of Evidential Strength.” in Aspects of Inductive Logic, ed. Hintikka, Jaakko and Suppes, Patrick, 81–95. Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics 43. Amsterdam: North-Holland.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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