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Science and Values: Are Value Judgments Always Irrelevant to the Justification of Scientific Claims?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Kristen Intemann*
Affiliation:
University of Washington
*
Send requests for reprints to the author, Department of Philosophy, University of Washington, Box 353350, Seattle, WA 98195; intemann@u.washington.edu.

Abstract

Several feminist theorists have claimed that feminist values ought to influence theory choice. Susan Haack has argued that this is implausible because normative claims about what ought to be the case can never provide justification for descriptive claims. I argue against one of the premises of Haack's argument. Furthermore, I attempt to show that the most promising defense of this premise would cast doubt on a second premise of Haack's argument. My aim is to open up the possibility that value judgments can play a legitimate role in theory choice.

Type
Science and Values
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 2001

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Footnotes

I would like to thank Marc Lange, Mika LaVaque-Manty, David Nixon, and especially Andrea Woody for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. This paper also greatly benefited from comments of audience members at the 2000 meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association.

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