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Comment on “The Natural Selection Model of Conceptual Evolution”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Donald T. Campbell
Donald T. Campbell*
Affiliation:
Northwestern University
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Abstract

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Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 44 , Issue 3 , September 1977 , pp. 502 - 507
Copyright
Copyright © 1977 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

Supported in part by NSF Grant GSOC 71–03704.

References

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