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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2022
In this note, we wish to remark on some of the relations between deciding one's own action and predicting one's own action. This topic is relevant both to current discussions of the nature of analysis and to the continuing controversy over the nature of scientific explanation.
1 See “The Logic of Explanation” by Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, in Philosophy of Science, 15, 1948 (reprinted in Readings in the Philosophy of Science, edited by Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck.)
2 “Do We Discover Our Uses of Words ?”, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LIV, No. 23: Nov. 7, 1957, p. 750.
3 op. cit., p. 757.
4 op. cit., p. 756.
5 ibid.
6 ibid.
7 ibid.
8 But cf. The Open Society and Its Enemies by K. R. Popper, especially note 4 to Chapter 9, and the references there cited.
9 Henle, op. cit., p. 754.
10 op. cit., p. 756.
11 op. cit., p. 755.
12 ibid.
