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Deep Conventionalism about Evolutionary Groups

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Matthew J. Barker  and
Joel D. Velasco
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Abstract

We reject a widespread objectivism about kinds of evolutionary groups in favor of a new conventionalism. Surprisingly, being any one kind of evolutionary group typically depends on which of many incompatible values are taken by suppressed variables. This novel pluralism underlies almost any single evolutionary group concept, unlike familiar pluralisms claiming that multiple concepts of certain sorts are legitimate. Consequently, we must help objective facts determine which candidate evolutionary groups satisfy the definition of a given evolutionary group concept, regardless of whether we also help determine the legitimacy of that concept’s applications.

Type
General Philosophy of Science
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 80 , Issue 5 , December 2013 , pp. 971 - 982
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

For helpful discussion, we thank David Baum, Ken Bond, Kenny Easwaran, Marc Ereshefsky, Laura Franklin-Hall, Luke Glynn, Matt Haber, Andrew Hamilton, Casey Helgeson, Chris Hitchcock, Roberta Millstein, Matt Slater, Elliott Sober, Marius Stan, Jacob Stegenga, Rob Wilson, and audiences at the Philosophy of Biology at Madison 2012 workshop and PSA 2012.

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