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Deep Plasticity: The Encoding Approach to Perceptual Change

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Mark Rollins
Mark Rollins*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy Washington University
*
†Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, Washington University, Campus Box 1073, St. Louis, MO 63130-4899, USA.
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Abstract

The basic problem of perceptual change is how to account for both variation and constancy in perceiving the world. Is order learned? How deep does plasticity go in that respect? I argue that different kinds of perceptual plasticity have been confused in recent debates, notably between J. Fodor and P. M. Churchland. By focusing on changes in the use of concepts, the issues in the Fodor-Churchland debate can be resolved. Beyond that debate, I propose a generalized encoding approach to perception as a way of accounting for a significant form of perceptual change.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 61 , Issue 1 , March 1994 , pp. 39 - 54
Copyright
Copyright © 1994 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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