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The Dilemma of Ahistorical Teleosemantics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 August 2023

Fabian Hundertmark Open the ORCID record for Fabian Hundertmark [Opens in a new window]
Fabian Hundertmark*
Affiliation:
Abteilung Philosophie, Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany
*
Email: fhundertmark@uni-bielefeld.de
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Abstract

Teleosemantic theories aim to naturalize mental representation through the use of functions, typically based on past selection processes. However, the historical dependence of these theories has faced severe criticism, leading some philosophers to develop ahistorical alternatives. This article presents a new dilemma for all ahistorical teleosemantic theories, focusing in particular on the theories proposed by Timothy Schroeder and Bence Nanay. These theories require certain dispositions in the producers or consumers of mental representations, but the appeal to dispositions puts the proponents in an undesirable position: mental content is either overly dependent on current circumstances or ultimately dependent on historical factors.

Type
Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 91 , Issue 1 , January 2024 , pp. 58 - 71
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association

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