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Dispositional Properties

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Herbert Hochberg
Herbert Hochberg*
Affiliation:
Ohio State University
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Abstract

An analysis of problematic dispositional predicates like ‘soluble’ is presented. The analysis attempts to combine cogent features of opposed previous analyses of Carnap and Bergmann, while avoiding problematic features of both. The suggestion that there is an ambiguity in negations of assertions of dispositional properties, and a consequent distinction between “not soluble” and “insoluble,” lies at the core of the solution.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 34 , Issue 1 , March 1967 , pp. 10 - 17
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1967

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References

REFERENCES

[1] Bergmann, G., “Comments on Professor Hempel's ‘The Concept of Cognitive Significance’,” in The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism, Longmans Green, New York.Google Scholar
[2] Bergmann, G., “Physics and Ontology” in Logic and Reality, Madison, 1964.Google Scholar