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Evolution and Continuity In Scientific Change

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Dudley Shapere
Dudley Shapere*
Affiliation:
Wake Forest University
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Abstract

The alleged problem of “incommensurability” is examined, and attempts to explain scientific change in terms of concepts of meaning and reference are analyzed and rejected. A way of understanding scientific change through a properly developed concept of “reasons” is presented, and the issues of reasons, meaning, and reference are placed in the context of this broader interpretation of scientific change.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 56 , Issue 3 , September 1989 , pp. 419 - 437
Copyright
Copyright © 1989 The Philosophy of Science Association

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