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How to Split Concepts: A Reply to Piccinini and Scott

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Edouard Machery
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Abstract

In “Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind” (2005), I argued that the notion of concept in psychology and in neuropsychology fails to pick out a natural kind. Piccinini and Scott (2006, in this issue) have criticized the argument I used to support this conclusion. They also proposed two alternative arguments for a similar conclusion. In this reply, I rebut Piccinini and Scott's main objection against the argument proposed in “Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind.” Moreover, I show that the two alternative arguments developed by Piccinini and Scott are not promising for supporting the conclusion that concepts are not a natural kind.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 73 , Issue 4 , October 2006 , pp. 410 - 418
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I would like to thank Gualtiero Piccinini, Dan Weiskopf, and Wayne Wu for their comments on previous versions of this reply.

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