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Marr on Computational-Level Theories

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Oron Shagrir
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Extract

According to Marr, a computational-level theory consists of two elements, the what and the why. This article highlights the distinct role of the Why element in the computational analysis of vision. Three theses are advanced: (a) that the Why element plays an explanatory role in computational-level theories, (b) that its goal is to explain why the computed function (specified by the What element) is appropriate for a given visual task, and (c) that the explanation consists in showing that the functional relations between the representing cells are similar to the “external” mathematical relations between the entities that these cells represent.

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Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 77 , Issue 4 , October 2010 , pp. 477 - 500
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I am thankful to Merav Ahissar, Colin Allen, Carl Craver, Frances Egan, Yosef Grodzinsky, Amit Hagar, Amir Horowitz, Otto Lappi, Arnon Levy, David Kaplan, Gualtiero Piccinini, Itamar Pitowsky, Nick Shea, Anna-Mari Rusanen, and Shimon Ullman. This research was supported by the Israel Science Foundation grant 725/08.

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