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A Novel Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Jan Sprenger
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Abstract

One of the most troubling and persistent challenges for Bayesian Confirmation Theory is the Problem of Old Evidence (POE). The problem arises for anyone who models scientific reasoning by means of Bayesian Conditionalization. This article addresses the problem as follows: First, I clarify the nature and varieties of the POE and analyze various solution proposals in the literature. Second, I present a novel solution that combines previous attempts while making weaker and more plausible assumptions. Third and last, I summarize my findings and put them into the context of the general debate about POE and Bayesian reasoning.

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Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 82 , Issue 3 , July 2015 , pp. 383 - 401
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

The author wishes to thank the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) for support of his research through Vidi grant 276-20-023. Peter Brössel, Clark Glymour, Branden Fitelson, Stephan Hartmann, Jonah Schupbach, participants of the Tilburg Center for Logic, Ethics and Philosophy of Science research seminars, and audiences in Dubrovnik and London improved the article with their helpful feedback.

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