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On When There Must Be a Time-Difference between Cause and Effect

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Carl G. Hedman
Carl G. Hedman*
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee
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Abstract

Building on two nonproblematic claims, I argue for a qualified endorsement of Hume's intuition that there must be a time-difference between cause and effect. Those claims are: (i) that the statement ‘A caused B’ is meaningful only if we have a criterion for saying ‘A’ and ‘B’ refer to distinct events; and (ii) that an adequate view of what it is to be an event must illuminate the enterprise of seeking to establish a singular causal statement. Specifically, I argue there must be a time-difference when cause and effect are modifications of the same physical object.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 39 , Issue 4 , December 1972 , pp. 507 - 511
Copyright
Copyright © 1972 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

REFERENCES

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