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The Relativity of Reality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

A. Bachem
A. Bachem*
Affiliation:
University of Illinois, Chicago Professional Colleges
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Extract

In the interesting discussion between Margenau (1) and Werkmeister (2) a baffling dilemma arises:

If verification of constructs makes up reality, and if verifications work retroactively, several different realities (in physics a Newtonian and a relativistic e.g.) may exist at the same time.

The writer, who—as a positivist—cannot accept a transcendental reality, as Werkmeister seemingly does, is not disturbed by a multitude of realities. He identifies reality with the most familiar and most generalized cognition. As such it varies with the mechanism of cognition and with the type and degree of integration.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , January 1953 , pp. 75 - 78
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1953

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References

(1) Margenau, H., The Nature of Physical Reality. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1950.Google Scholar
(2) Werkmeister, W. H., “Professor Margenau and the Problem of Physical Reality,” Philosophy of Science, XVIII, July, 1951, p. 183.10.1086/287151CrossRefGoogle Scholar