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Scientific Explanation between Principle and Constructive Theories

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Laura Felline
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Abstract

The aim of this article is to analyze the role of the distinction between principle and constructive theories in the question of the explanatory power of special relativity. We show how the distinction breaks down at the explanatory level. We assess Harvey Brown's claim that, as a principle theory, special relativity lacks explanatory power. We argue that this claim is based on an unrealistic picture of the kind of explanations provided by principle (and constructive) theories. Finally, we argue that the structural account of explanation captures the explanatory success of special relativity.

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Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 78 , Issue 5 , December 2011 , pp. 989 - 1000
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

This research was funded by a Master and Back grant from Regione Sardegna. I am very thankful to Guido Bacciagaluppi, Steven French, Mathias Frisch, Mauro Dorato, John Norton, and Bryan Roberts for comments on this article. I am especially thankful to Mathias Frisch and John Norton for their continuous support and encouragement.

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