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Simplicity and the Sub-Family Problem for Model Selection

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 May 2022

Alireza Fatollahi*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, Princeton, USA
Kasra Alishahi*
Affiliation:
Department of Mathematical Sciences, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran
*

Abstract

Forster and Sober (1994) introduced the “sub-family problem” for model selection criteria that recommend balancing goodness-of-fit against simplicity. This problem arises when a maximally simple model (family of hypotheses) is artificially constructed to have excellent fit with the data. We argue that the problem arises because of a violation of the general maxim that balancing goodness-of-fit against simplicity leads to desirable inferences only if one is comparing models for the consideration of which one has a positive reason independently of the current data.

Type
Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association

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