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Some Problems for “Alternative Individualism”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

R. A. Wilson
R. A. Wilson*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta
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Abstract

This paper points to some problems for the position that D.M. Walsh calls “alternative individualism,” and argues that in defending this view Walsh has omitted an important part of what separates individualists and externalists in psychology. Walsh's example of Hox gene complexes is discussed in detail to show why some sort of externalism about scientific taxonomy more generally is a more plausible view than any extant version of individualism.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 67 , Issue 4 , December 2000 , pp. 671 - 679
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, 4-115 Humanities, University of Alberta, Edmonton, T6G 2E5 Canada.

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