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Theoretical Functions, Theory and Evidence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

John Forge
John Forge*
Affiliation:
School of History and Philosophy of Science, University of New South Wales
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Abstract

Glymour's account of confirmation is seen to have paradoxical consequences when applied to the confirmation of theories containing theoretical functions. An alternative conception of instances derived from Sneed's reconstruction of physical theories is conjoined with the instance view of confirmation to produce an account of confirmation that avoids these problems. The topic of selective confirmation is discussed, and it is argued that theories containing theoretical functions are not selectively confirmable.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 51 , Issue 3 , September 1984 , pp. 443 - 463
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1984

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Footnotes

†

I should like to thank David Oldroyd, Barbara Davidson and this journal's anonymous referee for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.

References

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