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Toward a Synthesis of Deterministic and Probabilistic Formulations of Causal Relations by the Functional Relation Concept

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Stanley A. Mulaik
Stanley A. Mulaik*
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology
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Abstract

There have been two principal paradigms for the formulation of the causal relation–logical implication and functional relationship. In this paper, I present a case for preferring the functional relationship formulation and then discuss how the functional relationship formulation may be implemented in the probabilistic case in a manner analogous to the way others have implemented the logical implication formulation in the probabilistic case. I show how the “local independence” assumption found in many models used in the behavioral and social sciences is a consequence of the functional relation concept of probabilistic causality. I also discuss why causal relations are underdetermined in experience and are to be dealt with pragmatically in a hypothesis-testing framework.

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Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 53 , Issue 3 , September 1986 , pp. 313 - 332
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association 1986

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