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Truthlikeness, Translation, and Approximate Causal Explanation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Eric Barnes
Eric Barnes*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy Southern Methodist University
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Abstract

D. Miller's demonstrations of the language dependence of truthlikeness raise a profound problem for the claim that scientific progress is objective. In two recent papers (Barnes 1990, 1991) I argue that the objectivity of progress may be grounded on the claim that the aim of science is not merely truth but knowledge; progress thus construed is objective in an epistemic sense. In this paper I construct a new solution to Miller's problem grounded on the notion of “approximate causal explanation” which allows for linguistically invariant progress outside an epistemic context. I suggest that the notion of “approximate causal explanation” provides the resources for a more robust theory of progress than that provided by the notion of “approximate truth.”

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 62 , Issue 2 , June 1995 , pp. 215 - 226
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1995

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Footnotes

†

I am grateful to Douglas Ehring, Geoffrey Gorham, Paul Humphreys and an anonymous Philosophy of Science referee for comments and criticisms. I am grateful to the Denison University Research Fund for research support.

‡

Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75275.

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