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Turing Machine Arguments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

R. J. Nelson
R. J. Nelson*
Affiliation:
Case Western Reserve University
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Extract

In (Nelson 1976b) I used Turing machine arguments to show that computers can recognize humanly recognizable patterns in principle. In 1978 James D. Heffernan has expressed some doubts about such arguments. He does not question the propositions that I defend in the paper, nor the specific arguments in their support. What he does criticize are certain background assumptions.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 47 , Issue 4 , December 1980 , pp. 630 - 633
Copyright
Copyright © 1980 by Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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