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The Units of Selection and the Bases of Selection

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

David Walton
David Walton*
Affiliation:
Committee on the Conceptual Foundations of Science University of Chicago
*
‡Send reprint requests to the author, Committee on the Conceptual Foundations of Science, University of Chicago, 1126 East 59th Street, Room 207, Chicago, IL 60637.
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Abstract

A correct analysis of hierarchical selection processes must specify 1) the objects that succeed differentially as units, and 2) the properties that provide the causal bases for differential success. Here I illustrate how failing to recognize the units/bases distinction creates a contradiction in Elliott Sober's recent account of selection. A revised criterion for units of selection is developed and applied to examples at several biological levels. Criteria for bases of selection are discussed in terms of the degree of context-dependence and directness of a property's effect on the success of units. The significance of previous work by Sober, Wimsatt and Brandon is thereby clarified.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 58 , Issue 3 , September 1991 , pp. 417 - 435
Copyright
Copyright © 1991 The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I am grateful to David Hull, Ron McClamrock, Robert Richards, Elliot Sober, David Sloan Wilson and an anonymous referee for their insightful comments on this paper. I owe a special debt to William Wimsatt for his unflagging support of my work. Mardi Solomon provided much needed encouragement, for which I thank her.

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