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Accepted manuscript

Why the Liberality Criterion Is Dysfunctional for Theories of Ecological Function

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 August 2025

Colby J. Clark*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah
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Abstract

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Theories of ecological function often appeal to the liberality criterion to evaluate a theory’s adequacy. The liberality criterion requires that a functional description successfully differentiates between functions and nonfunctions. A functional description is considered inadequate if it is excessively liberal or excessively restrictive. I criticize the deference that is shown to the liberality criterion. I present a hypothetical case to illustrate how the application of the liberality criterion needlessly problematizes the four general theories of ecological function. Instead, a theory’s functional description should be considered adequate as long as it produces a better understanding of the complex phenomenon under study.

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Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Philosophy of Science Association