^{page 168 note 1} Ethik, c. 61, Gegensatzverhaltnis und Wertsynthese.

^{page 168 note 2} Cf. infra, p. 176, n. 2.

^{page 170 note 1} Cited by Williams, C. M., A Review of the Systems of Ethics founded on the Theory of Evolution, p. 117 (Macmillan, 1893).Google Scholar

^{page 172 note 1} Eth. Nic., V. i. 12–19.

^{page 172 note 2} Ibid., § 20, 11302 10, τι δε διαφρει ρεττ και δικαιοσνη ατη, δλον κ των ερημνων εατι μν γαρ ή αÏὓτη, τδ δ'εναι ου τ αυτ, λλ’ μν προς τερον, δικαιοσνη, δε τοιδε ξις απλς, αρετ.

^{page 172 note 3} I italicize words supplied in translation, after the manner of the authors of King James's translation of the Bible. The Greek—ον περ τν εξω πρξιν των ατον αλλ περ την εντς—is ambiguous; for των αντο may be either one's own duties, or the “parts” of one's own soul; in the next words—ςληθως περ εαυτν και τ αυτον—it is the latter; but there is probably a shift of meaning (one might almost say a play upon the words) indicated by ς αληθς.

^{page 172 note 4} γνη: i.e., what are also called the eidrj, or ftiprj, parts, of the soul.

^{page 173 note 1} Rep., IV. 443B–444A.

^{page 173 note 2} Eth. Nic., III. ii. 5, IIIID 15. kai πpoaip?oεi µ?ν ?πiθvµla ?vαντio?τai, ?πiθυµla δ’?πiθυµla o?.

^{page 174 note 1} νδε. τριν ντων τριττα και δονα μοι φανονται, ενς κστον μα δα. πιθνμαι ωσατως τε και ρα. ρα presumably are movers to action; they “take the initiative.”

^{page 174 note 2} Aristotle again finds a way of expressing this, by distinguishing in the genus ορξεως the three species of βολησις, θνμς αη επιθυμα. Vide De Anima, γ ix, 432 b 5–6; Magn. Mor., I. xii. 1187b 38, εδη τρα, επιθυμα, θυμς, βολησις. When Aristotle says, De Anima, γ ix. 432b 6–7, criticizing Plato for dividing the soul into parts,ε δ τρα φν,ν κστφ εοται δρεξις, he says what Plato would have readily admitted.

^{page 175 note 1} Or, as Plato says, Rep., x. 571B, by παράννμοι έπιθνμίοι.

^{page 176 note 1} It will be noted that the question when a desire should or should not be indulged is the question δτε δει, whereas how largely is δσον δει and only the latter is a question of degree.

^{page 177 note 2} Eth. Nic., II. vi. 15, 1106^b 36. ξις προαιρετικ, ν μεστητι οσα τ προς μς, ρισμνη λγφ κα φ ν φρνιμος ρσειεν. Burnet, taking the mean to be a combination of contrary impulses in the right proportion (as explained above, p. 1), took λγoς here to mean ratio, viz. the ratio in which they were combined. But these impulses would themselves be capable of varying in degree of strength, and it is difficult to see how the ratio in which they are to be combined, in order to secure the “mean” required, can be fixed unless the strength of each is first fixed. Yet this strength might in turn be regarded as involving a combination of contraries in a certain ratio, and so ad infinitum. Others have interpreted λγoς to mean “reason,” i.e. the faculty, τ λoγιστικv or (as Aristotle calls it) τ λγov γov. Apart from the question whether λγoς ever means this in Aristotle's writings, it seems a fatal objection to such an interpretation here, that it would make the last six words of the definition redundant. For a fool misuses the same faculty as a wise man uses, when he (the fool) misjudges the mean. Moreover, §7 of the chapter, 1106^a 36-^b5, where Aristotle illustrates what he intends by a μεστης πρς μς, supports the interpretation “rule”; rules for training, it seems to be meant, would fix limits that an athlete should not overstep in either direction to the amount of food or exercise to be taken; but for particular athletes the precisely right amounts will fall at different points between these limits, and these niceties cannot be fixed by the rule. The late J. Cook Wilson held that δpθδς λγoς in Aristotle's Ethics meant “right reason”; but Professor J. A. Smith, another eminent Aristotelian, has argued strongly for the interpretation “rule,” and I have borrowed the last argument from him.

^{page 177 note 1} Rep., IV. 430B.σωτηρν δι πντος δξης ρθς τε κα νομμον δεινν τε περ κα μ.

^{page 177 note 2} Eth. Nic., III. ix. 1110^a 31, in the discussion of vδρεια; cf. inter alia, ibid., VII. ix, where μμνειν τ προαιρσει, μμνειν τοις δξασι also occur. The weak or incontinent man, δ άκράττης,, under the influence of the desire or impulse of the moment, fails to abide by his resolve or purpose; the virtuous man, in whom it is necessary τν τε λγον ληθ εναι κα τν δρεξιδρθν, επερ προαρεσις σπουδαα (ibid., VI. ii. 2, 1138^b 24), will abide by his purpose.

^{page 178 note 1} Cf. supra, p. 177, n. 2.

^{page 180 note 1} Cf. supra, p. 176, n. 1.

^{page 180 note 2} Aristotle says that his µεσóτητες are πεpi πáθη καl πpáξεις, and the particular virtues differ according to the sort of πáθη and πpáξεις they concern.

^{page 181 note 1} III. xiv. I234^b 4.oταν μν γρ καλς νμαλοι αιν, ο μσοι γνονται· ν τφ μσφ γρ εστ πως τ κρα.