¹ Inaugural lecture delivered at the University of Münster (West Germany).

² The German word ‘herrschaftsfrei’, rendered here as ‘unconstrained’, might be translated literally as ‘dominionless’. This would bring out more clearly than ‘unconstrained’ the political connotations of the word as well as the connection, emphasized below, with the Greek archē.

³ ‘Phänomenologie und Sprachanalyse’, in Hermeneutik und Dialektik, Bubner, R., Cramer, K. and Wiehl, R. (eds.) (Festschrift for H.-G. Gadamer) (Tübingen, 1970), Vol. II, 3 f.Google Scholar

⁴ London, 1959.

⁵ London and Boston, 1973.

⁶ Ibid., 235.

⁷ ‘The general result, the author believes, is a comprehensive materialism, one that rests on logical rather than scientific foundations’—as the dust-jacket of the book proclaims.

⁸ Op. cit., 252–380.

⁹ Pages 146, 174, 238 mention the problem of God, but only in referring to the positions of others.

¹⁰ Not all (cf. for example, Anscombe, G. E. M. and Geach, P. T., Three Philosophers: Aristotle, Aquinas, Frege (Oxford, 1961)).Google Scholar

¹¹ For a criticism of this Aristotelian position see especially Flasch, K., ‘Historisch-systematische Exposition des Problems’, Die Metaphysik des Einen bei Nikolaus von Kues (Leiden, 1973), IGoogle Scholar. Teil, , 3–144.Google Scholar

¹² Op. cit., 28.

¹³ Op. cit., 4.

¹⁴ The reism of Kotarbiński is a linguistic version of a strictly materialistic ontology of things. Cf. Küng, G.'s remarks in Chapter 8 of his book Ontology and the Logistic Analysis of Language (Dordrecht, 1967)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Quinton also refers to Kotarbiński, , cf. op. cit., 11, 245.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Cf. for example Geist in Welt (München, 1957), 326Google Scholar; Hörer des Wortes (München, 1941), 154f.Google Scholar; Das Problem der Hominisation, (Freiburg/Basel/Wien, 1961), 52.Google Scholar

¹⁶ The vulgar notion of substance as an indeterminate substrate from which properties are hung like ‘hams from a beam’ lives on in the neoscholastic con ception of the soul. Cf. Russell, B., My Philosophical Development (London/New York, 1959), 161Google Scholar. (Quoted from Küng, G., op. cit., 71Google Scholar.) Küng is certainly right in his criticism of the empiricist conception of substance, but in fact remains himself (loc. cit.) committed to the neoscholastic misconception. Bernhard Lakebrink has subjected the neoscholastic conception behind this misunder standing to a thorough critique: see ‘Geist und Welt nach Thomas von Aquin’, in Thomas von Aquin im philosophischen Gespräch, Kluxen, W. (ed.) (Freiburg/München, 1975), 38–71.Google Scholar

¹⁷ In contrast to the German word for ousia, ‘Wesen’, the English expression ‘essence’ cannot be taken in a verbal sense. Heidegger has often pointed, in this connection, to such terms as Staatswesen, Verkehrswesen. ‘Being’, taken verbally, must therefore be strictly distinguished from the traditional concept of essence (essentia). G. E. M. Anscombe has shown that the concept of essentia, which is the target for most of the attacks on so-called Aristotelian essentialism, is not to be found in Aristotle. Cf. Anscombe/Geach, op. cit., 43. Schelling emphasized that the scholastic forma is a much more suitable translation of the Aristotelian ousia than the scholastic term essentia. See Schelling, 's Werke, Bd. XI, 406Google Scholar (on Met. Z. 7, 1032b, 1–21Google Scholar). The difference which Schelling hints at in the two notions is of course that marked by the scholastic distinction between forma substantiate und forma essentialis. It can scarcely be denied that Thomas Aquinas had a more sound logical theory of predication than did Aristotle (cf. Geach, , op. cit., 76Google Scholar); on the other hand, whether the resultant emphasis on the so-called forma essentialis (‘homo’) as against the forma substantiate (‘anima’ or ‘vivere’) can be considered an advance in every respect is doubtful (cf. my ‘Kritik und Metaphysik’, in Wiener Jahrbuch für Philosophie (1968), 67–91Google Scholar, on Schelling's interpretation of Aristotle with his rejection of forma essentialis).

¹⁸ See Sorabji, R., ‘Body and Soul in Aristotle’, Philosophy 49 (1974), 78, cf. p. 70.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

¹⁹ If one takes this verbal side of ousia into account, one is no longer confronted with the alternative of either some thing or nothing. Cf. R. Bambrough on Ryle: ‘Ryle was so concerned to make clear that there is no such thing as the mind that he has given the impression to many (and possibly sometimes even to himself) that there are no such things as minds’ (Proc. Arist. Society 72 (1971/1972), 66).Google Scholar

²⁰ For a critique of this standpoint, cf. Anscombe/Geach, op. cit., 17, 86.

²¹ Cf. Owen, G. E. L., ‘The Platonism of Aristotle’, in Studies on the Philosophy of Thought and Action, Strawson, P. F. (ed.) (Oxford, 1968), 156–163Google Scholar; Aristotle's Metaphysics, Books Γ Δ Ε, translated with notes by Kirwan, Christopher (Oxford, 1971), 100 fGoogle Scholar. Cf. as well Geach, P. T., in Three Philosophers, 76.Google Scholar

²² But cf. Leśniewski, 's ‘Ontology’Google Scholar. On the latter: Kahn, Ch. H., The Verb ‘Be’ in Ancient Greek (Dordrecht–Boston, 1973) 5Google Scholar.: ‘In Leśniewski's usage, “χ ε γ” may take as true substitution instances “Socrates is wise”, “Socrates is Socrates”, “Socrates is the husband of Xanthippe” or “the husband of Xanthippe is wise”. Identity (for individuals) is defined as a special case of the epsilon relation, namely the case where “χ ε γ” and “γ ε χ” are both true; and what Russell regarded as “a disgrace to the human race”, the use of a single sign for predication and identity, is thus in part justified’.

²³ Cf. the painstaking interpretation of Hermann Weidemann on Metaphysics Z 6, 10, 11, and H 3 (Metaphysik und Sprache. Eine sprachphilosophische Unter-suchung zu Thomas von Aquin und Aristoteles (Freiburg/München, 1975), 80–102Google Scholar) with a careful survey of the literature (unfortunately, however, without reference to Owen's essay cited in footnote 21).

²⁴ See Harter, E. D., ‘Aristotle on Primary ousia’, in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 57 (1975), 1–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar, who has put the somewhat confused discussion of the notion of ousia (Albritton, Lacey, Lesher, Woods) back on the right track, by focusing on the importance of eidos as energeia (forma substantialis) in contra-distinction to eidos in the sense of species (forma essentialis).

²⁵ Edition Vivès of the works of StThomas, (Parisiis, MDCCCLXXVI), Vol. XXI, p. 33, col. b towards the end.Google Scholar

²⁶ Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Bd. III (Jubiläumsausgabe), Bd. 19, 574.Google Scholar

²⁷ In his book Action, Emotion and Will (London, 1963)Google Scholar, which is partly dependent upon Ryle but is also critical of his behaviouristic tendencies, Anthony Kenny has subjected this theory to sharp criticism. Cf. the same author's ‘Thomas von Aquin über den Willen’, in Kluxen, W. (ed.), Thomas von Aquin im philosophischen Gespräch (Freiburg/München, 1975), 101–131.Google Scholar

²⁸ The Concept of Mind (London, 1949), 67.Google Scholar

²⁹ Ibid., 76.

³⁰ Summa Theologiae III, q. 18. a. 4Google Scholar (utrum in Christo fuerit liberum arbitrium), ad 1.

³¹ Cf. for example, Wittgenstein, , Philosophical Grammar, (Blackwell, 1974)Google Scholar, §§10, 11; and Ryle, , The Concept of Mind, Ch. 5Google Scholar. For the Aristotelian distinction between kinēsis and energeia and its unique difficulties, cf. especially Ackrill, J. L., ‘Aristotle's Distinction between Energeia and Kinēsis’, in Bambrough, Renford (ed.), New Essays on Plato and Aristotle (London/New York, 1965) 121–141.Google Scholar

³² Summa Theologiae I–II, q. 6, art. 4Google Scholar. The entire sentence is quoted and interpreted by Kenny, A. in ‘Thomas von Aquin über den Willen’, 109 ff.Google Scholar

³³ Werke, ed. Schlechta, , Bd. III, 501.Google Scholar

³⁴ Ibid., Bd. III, 485.

³⁵ Ibid., Bd. II, 580 f.

³⁶ Ibid., Bd. III, 540.

³⁷ ‘Formal kann das Gesagte so ausgedrückt werden, daß die Natur des Urteils oder Satzes überhaupt, die den Unterschied des Subjects und Prädikats in sich schließt, durch den spekulativen Satz zerstört wird, und der identische Satz, zu dem der weitere wird, den Gegenstoß zu jenem Verhältnis enthält’ (Phänomenologie des Geistes, Hoffmeister, (ed.), (Hamburg, 1952), 51Google Scholar). The form of the predicative proposition is, Hegel says, ‘one-sided and therefore false’ (Enzyklopädie (Hamburg: Ausgabe Nikolin Pöggeler, 1959), 62 §31 Zusatz).Google Scholar

³⁸ Cf. the well-balanced remarks of Kahn, Ch. H., in §1 (‘The Verb “Be” and the Question of Linguistic Relativism’) of The Verb ‘Be’ in Ancient Greek (Dordrecht-Boston, 1973).Google Scholar

³⁹ Comp. Werke, Bd. XIII, 229Google Scholar. As early as 1806 in the Aphorismen über die Naturphilosophie, Schelling had pointed to a transitive use of the copula, which is incompatible with predicational structure: ‘Eben dieß ist der Sinn des Satzes: “Gott ist alle Dinge”, welcher lateinisch nicht sowohl durch est res cunctae, als vielmehr (invita latinitate) durch est res cunetas ausgedrückt werden müßte (…die Dinge [werden] aus dem leidenden Fall in den aktiven erhoben…)’ (Werke, Bd. VII, 205Google Scholar). In order to emphasize this transitive sense, Schelling often capitalizes the copula or italicizes it, or both, e.g. Werke Bd. XI, 585Google Scholar. In keeping with the same insight, Thomas Aquinas sometimes pays more attention to the sense than to ordinary grammatical conventions: ‘Dicendum, quod non oportet formam, quae est prindpium essendi rem, esse principium cognoscendi rem per essentiam suam’ (De Ver., q. 8, art. 11 ad 4). Cf. the author's Forma formarum (Freiburg/München, 1970), S. 166Google Scholar; Transzendentale Einbildungskraft (Bonn, 1970), S. 40–45Google Scholar; Eindeutigkeit und Variation (Freiburg/München, 1973), S. 198–201.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Cf. Topitsch, E., Vom Ursprung und Ende der Metaphysik. Eine Studie zur Weltanschauungskritik (Wien, 1958)CrossRefGoogle Scholar Cf. also Kelsen, H., ‘Gott und Staat’Google Scholar und ‘Die hellenisch-makedonische Politik und die Politik des Aristoteles’, both in Aufsätze zur Ideologiekritik edited with an introduction by Topitsch, Ernst, (Neuwied, 1960).Google Scholar

⁴¹ It would be interesting to study the extent to which Anselm of Canterbury, the metaphysician who made the most explicit use of sociolegal terminology in treating the relation of God and man, employed careful linguistic analysis to emphasize the priority of the ontological relation. Cf. for example, Cur Deus Homo (München, 1970), 44.Google Scholar

⁴² Aquinas, , In Epist. ad Rom., c. 6, lect. 4 (ed. Vivès, , Bd. XX, Rom, 1876), 469Google Scholar, col. a. For Thomas' doctrine of freedom, cf. especially Zimmermann, A., ‘Der Begriff der Freiheit nach Thomas von Aquin’, in Thomas von Aquin 1274/1974, Oeing-Hanhoff, L. (ed.) (München, 1974), 125–161.Google Scholar

⁴³ Cf. for example I Peter 2, 15, 18–19.

⁴⁴ Nicomachean Ethics, IX, 1169 b 30.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Cf. Urs, Hans v. Balthasar, , Herrlichkeit, Eine theologische Ästhetik, III. Bd., 1. Teil (Im Raum der Metaphysik) (Einsiedeln, 1965), 21Google Scholar: ‘Bevor Ästhetik im späten Rationalismus (Baumgarten) und im Kritizismus (Kant) zu einer regional eingeschränkten Wissenschaft gemacht wurde, war sie—aufs Ganze der Über lieferung hin angeschaut—ein Aspekt der Metaphysik als der Wissenschaft vom Sein des Seienden, und sofern mit Sein das Letztbegründende der Weltvielheit gemeint war, war Metaphysik untrennbar von Theologie. Wie nun das vergäng-liche, fragmentarisch feststellbare Wahre und Gute der Welt, um verstehbar zu sein, verankert wurde in einem unvergänglich-ganzhaften Wahren und Guten, so auch das ereignishafte aufblitzende Schöne in einer unvergänglichen absoluten Schönheit, die in den heilen ρχαί des Seins—bei den “Göttern”, beim “Gött-lichen”, bei “Gott”—beheimatet ist.’