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Ontological Commitment and Paraphrase

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2009

Frank Jackson
Frank Jackson
Affiliation:
Monash University
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Extract

It is persons who are ontologically committed. But a person is not ontologically committed by virtue of his character, his height, his social standing or whatever, but by virtue of the sentences he assents to. Hence we should look to sentences for a criterion of ontological commitment. This is precisely what is done by advocates of what I will call the Referential theory. In this paper I argue that the Referential theory faces serious objections related to the role paraphrase must play in it. I then present a modified Referential theory and go on to discuss certain implications of the modified theory. More precisely, the paper divides up as follows. In §1 I present the Referential theory. In §2 I argue that it is in trouble over paraphrase. In §3 I consider a general objection to the arguments of §2. In §4 I present the modified theory. In §5 I consider the implications of the modified theory for polemic over what there is and for the existence of properties or universals.

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Type
Articles
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Philosophy , Volume 55 , Issue 213 , July 1980 , pp. 303 - 315
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1980

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References

1 See, e.g., Quine, W. V., Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1960)Google Scholar, §49, and ‘Existence and Quantification’, Ontological Relativity (New York: Columbia U.P., 1969), 90–113.Google Scholar

2 See, e.g., Pap, A., ‘Nominalism, Empiricism and Universals: I’, Philosophical Quarterly 9, No. 37 (10 1959), 330–340CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and for amore recent discussion directed to whether we should admit events into our ontology and which is unusually explicit about the role of the Referential theory in such discussions, see Chisholm, R., ‘States of Affairs Again’, Nous 5, No. 2 (05 1971), 179–189CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Davidson, D., ‘Eternal vs Ephemeral Events’, Nous 5, No. 2 (05 1971), 335–349.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 See, e.g., Quine, , Word and Object, op. cit., §27Google Scholar, and White, Morton, Toward Reunion in Philosophy (New York: Atheneum, 1963), ch. 4.Google Scholar

4 For a more detailed account of these and related points see Cartwright, R., ‘Ontology and the Theory of Meaning’, Philosophy of Science 21, No. 4 (10 1954), 316–325CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Scheffler, I. and Chomsky, N., ‘On What is Said to Be’, Proc. Aristotelian Society 58 (1958–1959), 71–82Google Scholar, and Stevenson, Leslie, ‘On What Sorts of Things There Are’, Mind 85, No. 340 (10 1976), 503–521.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 Cf. Alston, W. P.'s unduly neglected ‘Ontological Commitment’, Philosophical Studies 9, Nos. 1–2 (01–02 1958), 8–17CrossRefGoogle Scholar. However, the point is a premise in Alston's paper instead of a conclusion as here.

6 Reprinted in his From a Logical Point of View (New York: Harper, 1963), 1–19.Google Scholar

7 Reprinted in his The Ways of Paradox (New York: Random House, 1966), 199–207.Google Scholar

8 Cf. Gottleib, Dale, ‘Reference and Ontology’, Journal of Philosophy 71, No. 17 (10 1974), 587–599, esp. p. 587.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 See respectively Quine, , ‘On What There Is’, op. cit.Google Scholar, and Plantinga, A., The Nature of Necessity (London: Oxford U.P., 1974), 151.Google Scholar

10 Pace Jackson, F., ‘Statements About Universals’, Mind 86, No. 343 (07 1977). 427–429.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

11 ‘Existence and Quantification’, op cit., 106, my italics.Google Scholar

12 Op. cit., 10, my italics.Google Scholar

13 I am much indebted to Keith Campbell, Denis Robinson, John Fox, Tim Oakley, Robert Pargetter and the Editor for valuable comments on earlier drafts.