Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-2lccl Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-30T04:03:43.935Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Reconsidering the Ad Hominem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 April 2009

Christopher M. Johnson
Christopher M. Johnson
Affiliation:
University of Alberta
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Ad hominem arguments are generally dismissed on the grounds that they are not attempts to engage in rational discourse, but are rather aimed at undermining argument by diverting attention from claims made to assessments of character of persons making claims. The manner of this dismissal however is based upon an unlikely paradigm of rationality: it is based upon the presumption that our intellectual capacities are not as limited as in fact they are, and do not vary as much as they do between rational people. When we understand rationality in terms of intellectual virtues, however, which recognize these limitations and provide for the complexity of our thinking, ad hominem considerations can sometimes be relevant to assessing arguments.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 84 , Issue 2 , April 2009 , pp. 251 - 266
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2009

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 See for example Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic, as referenced by Hinman, 338 (see note 6).

2 Philosophical consideration of the ad hominem can be traced back to Aristotle (see Chichi, Graciela Marti, ‘The Greek Roots Of The Ad Hominem-Argument’, Argumentation 16 (2002), 333–348CrossRefGoogle Scholar), but is more recently traced back to Locke in his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Locke's account is essentially a repetition of Aristotle's defence of the ad hominem in his Topics and Sophisticated Refutations (see Woods, John, Paradox and Paraconsistency. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 21Google Scholar), in which the ad hominem is considered an acceptable criticism of inconsistencies that may exist between a thesis a person proposes and consequences that can be drawn from their other related claims. The essential thought is that it is both appropriate and reasonable to confront a person with the undesirable or unforeseen logical consequences of their assertions. The objection does not so much demonstrate the falsity of the thesis, only the inconsistency of the defence of the thesis, which demonstrates an error of reasoning. An example would be objecting to a communist who argues that socially run programmes would better be managed by private interests. There is thus considerable divergence between the ad hominem as considered by Aristotle and Locke and as it is generally thought of today.

3 Woods, John and Walton, Douglas, ‘Ad Hominem’, Philosophical Forum 8 (1978), 1–20Google Scholar. (4)

4 Op. cit. note 3, 10.

5 See note 13.

6 Hinman, Lawrence, ‘The Case For Ad Hominem Arguments’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60 (1982), 338–345CrossRefGoogle Scholar. (339)

7 Op. cit. note 6, 339.

8 Op. cit. note 6, 339.

9 Op. cit. note 6, 341.

10 Op. cit. note 6, 341.

11 Jason, Gary James, ‘Is There A Case For Ad Hominem Arguments?’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1984), 182–185CrossRefGoogle Scholar. (183)

12 For more on epistemic virtues in the manner I consider them, see Hookway, Christopher, ‘How to be a Virtue Epistemologist,’ in Intellectual Virtue, DePaul, Michael and Zagzebski, Linda eds. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003)Google Scholar; Hookway, Christopher, ‘Reasons for Belief, Reasoning, Virtues’, Philosophical Studies 130 (2006), 4–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Zagzebski, Linda, Virtues of the Mind. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13 It seems that considerations of this sort bear on the legitimacy of ad hominem evaluations of witness testimony in the courtroom. One's intellectual credibility is affected by one's history and moral credibility.

14 The moral virtues that is might suggest how deeply one's intellectual virtues run. If several moral virtues support one intellectual virtue, this intellectual virtue might thereby be taken to be more deeply held than another's intellectual virtue that is supported by but one evident moral virtue.

15 My thanks to Adam Morton for helpful comments on earlier versions of this essay.