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Asserting, Knowing and Being Sure

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 September 2025

Davide Fassio
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Abstract

It has been argued that assertion is governed by both a knowledge norm and a surety norm. According to a standard view (Unger, 1975; Williamson, 2000), the knowledge norm is more fundamental. The surety norm can be derived from the knowledge norm. This orthodoxy has recently been challenged. Goodman and Holguin (2022) have argued for an alternative picture in which the surety norm is more fundamental. The knowledge norm can be derived from the surety norm and a further norm according to which one should be sure only of what one knows. In this paper, I defend the orthodox view from Goodman and Holguin’s challenges. I provide objections to their account of how the knowledge and surety norms are related and to their arguments against the orthodox view.

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Type
Research Article
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Philosophy , Volume 100 , Issue 2 , April 2025 , pp. 203 - 219
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Royal Institute of Philosophy

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