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Before the Mereological Fallacy: A Rejoinder to Rom Harré

  • P. M. S. Hacker (a1)

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1 Harré, ‘Behind the Mereological Fallacy’, Philosophy 85 (2012), 352.

2 Bennett, M. R. and Hacker, P. M. S., Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (Blackwell, Oxford, 2003), 73.

3 Searle, J. R., ‘Putting Consciousness back in the Brain: Reply to Bennett and Hacker’, in Bennett, M., Dennett, D., Hacker, P. and Searle, J., Neuroscience and Philosophy: Mind, Brain, and Language (Columbia University Press, New York, 2007), 107.

4 We replied in Neuroscience and Philosophy, 133–5.

5 The Physical Basis of Mind, 441.

6 I have elaborated this distinction, which is crucial for the resolution of the mind/body problem, in Human Nature: the Categorial Framework (Blackwell, Oxford, 2007), ch. 9.

7 ‘Behind the Mereological Fallacy’, 338.

8 ‘Behind the Mereological Fallacy’, 350.

9 Rather surprisingly, Harré says that organs are substances (337). But this is mistaken. A functional part of a living substance is not itself a substance. For elaboration, see Human Nature: the Categorial Framework, 42–5.

10 See von Wright, G. H., The Varieties of Goodness (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963), III – 8.

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