^{page 58 note 1} 3rd dialogue between Hylas and Philonous, p. 274. (Page numbers refer to the Everyman edition.)

^{page 58 note 2} Principles of Human Knowledge, Introduction, § xxv.

^{page 58 note 3} Ibid., § xviii.

^{page 58 note 4} Ibid., Introduction, § iii.

^{page 58 note 5} 2nd dialogue, p. 250.

^{page 59 note 1} 1st dialogue, p. 231.

^{page 59 note 2} 2nd dialogue, p. 254.

^{page 59 note 3} 1st dialogue, p. 212.

^{page 59 note 4} The Concept of Mind, p. 64.

^{page 59 note 5} 1st dialogue, p. 227.

^{page 59 note 6} 3rd dialogue, p. 264.

^{page 60 note 1} The Concept of Mind, p. 16.

^{page 60 note 2} 3rd dialogue, p. 301.

^{page 60 note 3} 3rd dialogue, p. 265.

^{page 60 note 4} 2nd dialogue, p. 258.

^{page 61 note 1} 3rd dialogue, p. 301.

^{page 62 note 1} Throughout this paper I use Berkeley's phrase “by way of ideas” to refer to the knowledge obtained by means of common sense and scientific observation.

^{page 62 note 2} 2nd dialogue, p. 241.

^{page 62 note 3} The chief point of Philonous” argument here is to show that the physiologist's story is not a causal explanation of perception; but this is very problematic.

^{page 62 note 4} 3rd dialogue, p. 278. My italics.

^{page 63 note 1} In what follows I am much indebted to a lecture (unpublished) by Professor D. M. Mackinnon.

^{page 63 note 2} Philosophy, Jan. 1949, p. 69. Discussion of Carnap's Meaning and Necessity.

^{page 63 note 3} The Concept of Mind, p. 187.

^{page 64 note 1} Principles, § cxxxix. My italics.

^{page 64 note 2} Ibid., Introduction, § xviii.

^{page 64 note 3} Ibid., Introduction, § xxiv.

^{page 64 note 4} Ibid., § cxl. Cf. § cxxxvi. My italics.

^{page 64 note 5} Ibid., § cxl.

^{page 64 note 6} The Concept of Mind, p. 23.

^{page 65 note 1} According to Lord Russell (Mind, July 1951), Wittgenstein once held that all existential propositions were meaningless. Possibly Wittgenstein was thinking along the same lines as Berkeley and Ryle.

^{page 66 note 1} To refer to the mistake involved here, I use the words “metaphysics,” “metaphysical” in inverted commas. I should like to make clear that I am not denying the possibility of metaphysics in any militant sense. I am not saying, for instance, that the only legitimate types of statement are those whose truth is known by empirical observation. It is simply that the word “metaphysics” (and even more the word “ontology”–see G. J. Warnock, “Metaphysics in Logic,” Proc. Ar. Soc, 1950–51) is frequently understood as being wedded to the “absolute–existence” mistake; and the Berkeley–Ryle view which attacks “absolute existence” has, I believe, only to be stated to be agreed with.

^{page 66 note 2} 3rd dialogue, p. 267.

^{page 66 note 3} J. Wisdom, Proc. Ar. Soc, 1949–1950, p. 151.

^{page 67 note 1} I owe this criterion of substance to Mr. A. G. N. Flew.

^{page 67 note 2} 3rd dialogue, p. 301.

^{page 68 note 1} K. Koffka, Gestalt Psychology, chapter 3, p. 70.

^{page 69 note 1} 3rd dialogue, p. 276.

^{page 69 note 2} 2nd dialogue, p. 253.

^{page 69 note 3} The Concept of Mind, p. 81.

^{page 70 note 1} Principles, § cxliv.

^{page 70 note 2} 3rd dialogue, p. 276.

^{page 70 note 3} Cf. Plato, Sophist, 247E.

^{page 70 note 4} I suspect, however, that philosophers have not sufficiently appreciated the complicated nature of awareness of our own body–image or “schema.” Abnormal cases are particularly instructive, e.g. phantom–limbs, or failure to recognize parts of one's body as “belonging.” See specially H. Head, Aphasia and Kindred Disorders of Speech.

^{page 70 note 5} Cf. Mrs. Kneale, Proc. Ar. Soc, 1949–1950: “What is the mind–body problem?” p. 121, for an excellent discussion of this point.

^{page 71 note 1} See The Concept of Mind, p. 199.