Skip to main content
    • Aa
    • Aa
  • Get access
    Check if you have access via personal or institutional login
  • Cited by 8
  • Cited by
    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Shapiro, Janet 2012. Ethically Informed Practice with Families Formed via International Adoption: Linking Care Ethics with Narrative Approaches to Social Welfare Practice. Ethics and Social Welfare, Vol. 6, Issue. 4, p. 333.

    JENSEN, KARSTEN KLINT and LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN, KASPER 2008. Understanding Particularism*. Theoria, Vol. 71, Issue. 2, p. 118.

    LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN, KASPER 2008. On Denying A Significant Version Of The Constancy Assumption*. Theoria, Vol. 65, Issue. 2-3, p. 90.

    Allmark, Peter 2006. An Argument for the use of Aristotelian Method in Bioethics. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, Vol. 9, Issue. 1, p. 69.

    McKEEVER, SEAN and RIDGE, MICHAEL 2005. The Many Moral Particularisms. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 35, Issue. 1, p. 83.

    Simpson, Evan 1999. Between Internalism and Externalism in Ethics. The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 49, Issue. 195, p. 201.

    Simpson, Evan 1997. Rights Thinking. Philosophy, Vol. 72, Issue. 279, p. 29.

    Deveaux, Monique 1995. Shifting Paradigms: Theorizing Care and Justice in Political Theory. Hypatia, Vol. 10, Issue. 2, p. 115.


Caring about Justice

  • Jonathan Dancy (a1)
  • DOI:
  • Published online: 01 January 2009

In the post-Gilligan debate about the differences, if any, between the ways in which people of different genders see the moral world in which they live, I detect two assumptions. These can be found in Gilligan's early work, and have infected the thought of others. The first, perhaps surprisingly, is Kohlberg's Kantian account of one moral perspective, the one more easily or more naturally operated by men and which has come to be called the justice perspective. (What I mean by calling this Kantian will emerge shortly.) This is the perspective whose claims Gilligan initially found suspect, not because she thought it a distorted account of the way in which male subjects operated, but because she disputed its claims to be the only account or the best or dominant one. Throughout the ensuing debate Kohlberg's account has been left in place, and challenged not for correctness but only for uniqueness.

Linked references
Hide All

This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

O. Flanagan and K. Jackson , ‘Justice, Care and Gender: The Post-Gilligan Debate Revisited’, Ethics 97 (1987), 622–37.

John McDowell Virtue And Reason’, The Monist, 62 (1979), 331–50

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

  • ISSN: 0031-8191
  • EISSN: 1469-817X
  • URL: /core/journals/philosophy
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *