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  • Cited by 3
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Putnam, Ruth Anna 2008. Why Not Moral Realism?1. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Vol. 16, Issue. 1, p. 17.

    Shweder, Richard A. 1990. In Defense of Moral Realism: Reply to Gabennesch. Child Development, Vol. 61, Issue. 6, p. 2060.

    Putnam, H. 1986. Realismus in der Philosophie und Realismus in der Physik. Physik Journal, Vol. 42, Issue. 4, p. 107.


Creating Facts and Values

  • Ruth Anna Putnam (a1)
  • DOI:
  • Published online: 01 January 2009

Moral sceptics maintain that there are no objective moral values, or that there is no moral knowledge, or no moral facts, or that what looks like a statement which makes a moral judgment is not really a statement and does not have a truth-value. All of this is rather, unclear because all of it is negative. It will be necessary to remove some of this unclarity because my aim in this paper is to establish a proposition which may be summarized by saying: even if there are no objective moral values in one sense, there are objective moralvalues in another sense, and the latter values are good enough to do some of the jobs that objective values in the first sense would have done. A useful analogy might be that of a person who has lost her hand and has been given a prosthesis. In one sense the prosthesis is not as real (because man-made) as the hand, in another sense it is just as real (both are physical objects); most importantly, the person can do with the prosthesis enough of what she could do with the hand to make do.

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  • ISSN: 0031-8191
  • EISSN: 1469-817X
  • URL: /core/journals/philosophy
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