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Criticizing Preferences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2009

David Collingridge
David Collingridge
Affiliation:
University of Aston in Birmingham
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Extract

In this paper I wish to take my earlier analysis of the relationship between facts and preferences further to cast light on how some types of preference claims might be assessed. I have argued that both Hume's Rule and the doctrine of the autonomy of values must be rejected on grounds of elementary logic. To take a well worn example:

Re-arranging gives:

Information

Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy , Volume 59 , Issue 228 , April 1984 , pp. 231 - 241
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1984

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References

1 Collingridge, D.. ‘The Autonomy of Evaluation’, Journal of Value Inquiry, 14, (1980), 119-127.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Geach, P., ‘Imperatives and Deontic Logic’, Analysis, I8, (1958), 49-56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 A further, more detailed discussion can be found in Collingridge, D., Critical Decision Making: A New Theory of Social Choice (London: Frances Pinter, 1982).Google Scholar

4 Among others who have come near proposing, or have proposed fallibilist views of ethics are: Brown, J., ‘The Appraisal of Value Judgements’, Ratio 18 (1976), 56–72; Edel, A., Method in Ethical Theory (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), 318; Hare, R., Freedom and Reason (Oxford University Press, 1963), 87–88, 92 and 136; Humphrey, C., ‘The Testability of Value Claims, Journal of Value Inquiry, 3, (1969–1970), 221–227; Mesthene, E., ‘On the Need for a Scientific Ethic’, Philosophy of Science, 14, (1947), 96–101; and especially Watkins, J., ‘Negative Utilitarianism’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 37, (1963), 95–114, and Decision and Belief in Decision Making (London: BBC, 1967), 9–26.Google Scholar

5 Collingridge, D., Critical Decision Making: A New Theory of Social Choice, (London: Frances Pinter, 1982), 114–120.Google Scholar

6 Collingridge, D., The Social Control of Technology, (London: Frances Pinter, 1980), Ch. 11.Google Scholar

7 Smart, J., Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics (Melbourne University Press, 1961).Google Scholar