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Dissolving the Moral Contract
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 January 2009
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What response is to be given to the immoralist's question ‘Why should I be just?’? I say ‘response’ because it is not clear that the immoralist is looking for an answer. His question seems to be rhetorical, even contemptuous. It nevertheless presents a challenge to morality. The immoralist's position is that it is irrational to take justice and fairness seriously and that his own advantage or self-interest (perhaps in a very wide sense) is the only rational consideration for him. This is not a moral position although it is a normative position; the immoralist has an alternative to the moral life but not an alternative morality. (Compare how some lifestyles are appropriately presented as alternatives to religion but not as alternative religions.) The immoralist is not a moralist with idiosyncratic views on what is just and fair—what he might call ‘true’ justice or ‘natural’ justice. On the contrary, where some co-operative mutually beneficial project is involved he presumably recognizes what is fair (or at least what is patently unfair) much as we all do. What he does not recognize is the rationality of being fair. Nor is this because he thinks there is some other consideration (moral or otherwise) which overrides justice in this particular case. He does not deal with our complaint ‘But that isn't fair!’ by presenting other, allegedly overriding, considerations. Rather, such a complaint is not granted an initial relevance. ‘Why should I be just?’ he says.
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References
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