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  • Cited by 6
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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Bengson, John 2015. A Noetic Theory of Understanding and Intuition as Sense-Maker. Inquiry, Vol. 58, Issue. 7-8, p. 633.

    Stratton-Lake, Philip 2013. International Encyclopedia of Ethics.

    2000. A Psychological Approach to Ethical Reality.

    Geiger, Gebhard 1995. Why are there no objective values?. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, Vol. 26, Issue. 1, p. 35.

    Shweder, Richard A. and Haidt, Jonathan 1993. THE FUTURE OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY:. Truth, Intuition, and the Pluralist Way. Psychological Science, Vol. 4, Issue. 6, p. 360.

    WALLER, BRUCE 1984. Purposes, Conditioning, and Skinner's Moral Theory: Comments on Mills' Observations. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, Vol. 14, Issue. 3, p. 355.


Ethical Intuitionism


North.—What is the trouble about moral facts? When someone denies that there is an objective moral order, or asserts that ethical propositions are pseudo-propositions, cannot I refute him (rather as Moore refuted those who denied the existence of the external world) by saying: “You know very well that Brown did wrong in beating his wife. You know very well that you ought to keep promises. You know very well that human affection is good and cruelty bad, that many actions are wrong and some are right”?

West.—Isn't the trouble about moral facts another case of trouble about knowing, about learning? We find out facts about the external world by looking and listening; about ourselves, by feeling; about other people, by looking and listening and feeling. When this is noticed, there arises a wish to say that the facts are what is seen, what is heard, what is felt; and, consequently, that moral facts fall into one of these classes. So those who have denied that there are “objective moral characteristics” have not wanted to deny that Brown's action was wrong or that keeping promises is right.

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  • ISSN: 0031-8191
  • EISSN: 1469-817X
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