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    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Rheins, Jason G. 2016. A Companion to Ayn Rand.


    Bode, Stefan Murawski, Carsten Soon, Chun Siong Bode, Philipp Stahl, Jutta and Smith, Philip L. 2014. Demystifying “free will”: The role of contextual information and evidence accumulation for predictive brain activity. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, Vol. 47, p. 636.


    Flaig, Nicole K. and Large, Edward W. 2014. Dynamic musical communication of core affect. Frontiers in Psychology, Vol. 5,


    Miles, James B. 2013. ‘Irresponsible and a Disservice’: The integrity of social psychology turns on the free will dilemma. British Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 52, Issue. 2, p. 205.


    Golembiewski, Jan Alexander 2012. Common psychotic symptoms can be explained by the theory of ecological perception. Medical Hypotheses, Vol. 78, Issue. 1, p. 7.


    Schüür, Friederike and Haggard, Patrick 2011. What are self-generated actions?. Consciousness and Cognition, Vol. 20, Issue. 4, p. 1697.


    Ostrowick, John M 2007. The Timing Experiments of Libet and Grey Walter. South African Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 26, Issue. 3, p. 271.


    GOETZ, STEWART 2005. Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and Begging the Question. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 29, Issue. 1, p. 83.


    Levy, Daniel A. 2003. Neural holism and free will. Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 16, Issue. 2, p. 205.


    Klein, Stanley 2002. Libet's Research on the Timing of Conscious Intention to Act: A Commentary. Consciousness and Cognition, Vol. 11, Issue. 2, p. 273.


    Klein, Stanley 2002. Libet's Timing of Mental Events: Commentary on the Commentaries. Consciousness and Cognition, Vol. 11, Issue. 2, p. 326.


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Free Will as a Problem in Neurobiology

Abstract

The problem of free will arises because of the conflict between two inconsistent impulses, the experience of freedom and the conviction of determinism. Perhaps we can resolve these by examining neurobiological correlates of the experience of freedom. If free will is not to be an illusion, it must have a corresponding neurobiological reality. An explanation of this issue leads us to an account of rationality and the self, as well as how consciousness can move bodies at all. I explore two hypotheses. On the first, freedom is a complete illusion. On the second, it is not an illusion, and there is a corresponding indeterminism at the neurobiological level. This can only occur if there is in fact a quantum mechanical element in the fundamental neurobiology of consciousness.

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Philosophy
  • ISSN: 0031-8191
  • EISSN: 1469-817X
  • URL: /core/journals/philosophy
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