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Getting Around Language

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2009

Richard Mason
Richard Mason
Affiliation:
Wolfson College, Cambridge
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Extract

(i) Heraclitus wrote that human nature does not have right understanding, but divine nature does. The goddess of Parmenides tells us the Truth: that what exists is whole, single, undivided. We say (‘in our language’) that things are separably nameable and describable. That is incorrect. So ‘our’ use of language embodies error. In the Cratylus, Socrates says that the gods call things by names that are naturally right.

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Articles
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Philosophy , Volume 72 , Issue 280 , April 1997 , pp. 259 - 268
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1997

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References

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