How We Trust One Another

¹ N. Kolodny and R.J. Wallace, ‘Promises and Practices Revisited’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 31:2 (2003), pp. 119–154.

² For other formulations or versions of the problem see Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 3.2.5; H.A. Prichard, Moral Obligation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), ch. 7; G.J. Warnock, The Object of Morality (London: Methuen, 1971), ch. 7; T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge MA/London: Belknap, 1998), ch. 7; and Kolodny & Wallace op. cit.

³ Scanlon's use of ‘the fact’ in the second passage appears to be question-begging. What is at stake in the circularity objection is precisely whether there is such a fact.

⁴ For further discussion of these points, see A.I. Melden, Rights and Persons (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977), chs. 2 & 4.

⁵ According to G.J. Warnock, the obligation of promises is nothing other than ‘the requirement of veracity’ (op. cit., 109). Just as ‘I should say I have done what I actually have done,’ so ‘I should do what I have said I will do’ (111): what is required in both cases is agreement between statements and facts. But this is not a good comparison. An expression of intention would be described as ‘false’ if the speaker had no intention to do what he said, and not because he had failed to do it. On the other hand, the blame for breaking a promise would not depend on whether the speaker had the intention to do what he promised.

⁶ This idea of ‘a special sign’ coming into being may seem similar to Hume's supposition, quoted earlier, that ‘there is a certain form of words invented, by which we bind ourselves …’. But whereas Hume was dealing with the origin of promising, this is not the case that I have imagined. In the latter case, the practice of promising already exists and we are merely helping ourselves to new expressions to replace those that have been forbidden.

⁷ John Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 35; and ‘How to Derive “Ought” From “Is”’, in W.D. Hudson (ed.), The Is/Ought Question (London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 132. Hare's article also appears in Hudson.

⁸ According to Mackie, one can choose to endorse this institution by making a promise, but one can also choose to withdraw from it ‘when the time comes for payment’. In this way the obligation of promise-keeping would be endorsement-dependent at the time of making the promise and again at the time of keeping it (J.L. Mackie, Ethics, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), p. 70). But how are we to imagine this? Can someone who promised say ‘I don't want to play any more’ when the time comes to pay up? In some cases, it is true, one can choose to withdraw a promise prior to the time of keeping it. Thus I might tell you that I shall not be coming to the party tomorrow as I had promised. But this would not be a case of refusing to endorse or participate in an institution.

⁹ Compare A.I. Melden's critique of Rawls in Rights and Persons. ‘It is not a rule that we have that provides a reason for keeping a promise, but a right that has been conferred’ (P. 9). The treatment of promising in terms of games and institutions is well criticized by Melden in his chapters II and IV.

¹⁰ This article was prepared for publication after Professor Hanfling's death. The Editor wishes to thank John Hyman, Edward Harcourt, and Juliet Hanfling for help in preparing the manuscript for publication.